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Shields: From Clinical Integration to Accountable Care

From Clinical Integration to Accountable
Care
Mark Shields, MD*
I. BACKGROUND

The American health care system has been unable to deliver high quality
care consistently across populations' and to deliver value for the healthcare
delivered.2 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(PPACA) proposes several innovations that attempt to improve both the
quality and affordability of health care services. These innovations include
bundling services for payment, encouraging the patient centered medical
home, and increasing accountable care organizations (ACOs). ACOs, as
well as these other innovations, require that physicians work together across
specialties to improve the quality, safety, and cost-effectiveness of health
services. There are four key challenges, however, to the widespread application of ACOs.4 These challenges are: (1) the dominance of small physician practices, (2) the dominance of fee-for-service reimbursement, (3) the
weaknesses of traditional hospital medical staff, and (4) acceptance by the
commercial market.5 This article briefly describes Advocate Physician
Partners (APP), which demonstrates a model that has overcome these challenges and provides a basis for the development of an ACO. We believe
this is a replicable model that can assist many providers in enhancing efficiency, delivering high quality care, and creating an ACO.
* Dr. Mark Shields is Senior Medical Director, Advocate Physician Partners (APP) and Vice
President of Medical Management, Advocate Health Care. In this role, he oversees all clinical functions related to 3800 physicians aligned with APP and the ten Advocate hospitals.
1.
INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEw HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 360 (Nat'l Acad. Press 2001); Elizabeth McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health
Care Deliveredto Adults in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2635-45 (2003).
2. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & EDUC. RESEARCH TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS
2007 ANNUAL SURVEY 19, ex. 1.1, availableat http://www.kff.orglinsurance/7672/upload
/76723.pdf.
3. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3023, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.).
4. Mark Shields et al., A Model ForIntegratingIndependent Physicians Into Accountable Care Organizations,30 HEALTH AFF. 161, 161 (2011).
5. Id. at 161-62.
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II. FOUR CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATED AND ACCOUNTABLE CARE
The first challenge to attaining integrated care is that most physicians
practice in small groups or solo practices. These structures lack the capital
or depth of management commonly associated with larger groups, many of
which that have consistently delivered quality and cost effective outcomes.
Second, fee-for-service reimbursement to physicians - the dominant mode
of payment - encourages volume and does not pay for key tasks needed to
provide high-quality cost-effective services. Those tasks not reimbursed
by fee-for-service payments include care management of complex cases;
use of electronic tools, such as disease registries and quality reporting; and
use of alternative patient encounters, such as electronic visits or scheduled
8
Third, existing hospital medical staff structures
telephone encounters.
makes it difficult to provide incentives to doctors for improved performance
or to discipline them for poor cost-effectiveness, quality, or safety.9 Finally, the commercial market will need to be involved in the support payment
structures that facilitate ACOs since the reengineering of clinical practice
and the cost of infrastructure must be spread across a large patient base, not
just patients covered by governmental payers. 0 APP has demonstrated an
ability to overcome these four challenges facing the successful development
of ACOs."
III. STRUCTURE TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES

APP offers policymakers a strong example of a health care system that
could serve as one of the models for ACOs encouraged by the PPACA.
APP is a joint venture between Advocate Health Care (Advocate), a not-forprofit, faith-based health system in northern and central Illinois, and has approximately 3800 physicians in Illinois. Advocate employs approximately
850 physicians in large multi-specialty groups throughout its 10 hospital
campuses offering numerous services, including homecare.' 2 Each hospital
and its associated partnership physicians (employed and independent) have
a local Physician Hospital Organization (PHO) board that leads the physicians towards quality, patient safety, and cost goals.13 There are 2900 inde-

6.

Id. at 161; see

PRACTICES:

NAT'L COMM.
LESSONS
FOR

FOR QUALITY
HEALTH

ASSURANCE,
REFORM,

SUPPORTING SMALL
available
at

http://www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/HEDISQM/CLAS/Briefing/SmallPracticesReport.pdf.
7. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 162.
8. See id. at 163.
9. Id. at 162.
10. Id. at 169.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 162.
13. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 162.
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pendent physicians in the partnership who typically are in solo or small
(three physicians or less) single specialty group practices.14 There are over
900 such small practices in APP.'5 The types of APP practices include: solo and group; single specialty and multi-specialty; and employed and independent.' 6
APP has two membership classes that have an equal number of governance votes: one for Advocate and one for the PHOs." A majority of each
class is required for a measure to pass.' 8 Physicians elect the leaders of
each local PHO who then send a delegate to APP's Board.19 This ensures
that independent physicians share in the PHOs' governance with Advocate.
Furthermore, employed physicians occupy many of the Advocate governance seats in APP, thereby placing physicians in a super majority and hospital managers in the minority.20 This creates a structure for both physicians and hospitals to work together to improve care with common quality
and cost effectiveness goals. 2 1
For over fifteen years APP has performed care management and managed care contracting.2 2 Member physicians provide care for almost
1,000,000 patients in commercial health insurance programs, 230,000 in
health maintenance organizations (HMO) plans and over 700,000 in fee-forservice plans.23 Physicians and hospitals are collectively accountable for
quality and cost during negotiations with payers because APP negotiates on
behalf of both Advocate and physicians, and signs single signature contracts
- contracts that APP executes and members of APP must accept. 24 Physicians must also meet strict membership requirements such as a threshold

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 162. For more information about governance at Advocate, see Physician
Governance,ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE, http://www.advocatehealth
.com/body.cfm?id=1898 (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
18. Id.
19. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 162.
20. Id. at 162-63.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also About Advocate Physician Partners, ADVOCATE HEALTH CARE,
http://www.advocatehealth.coml body.cfm?id=1 126 (last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (describing
APP as a "care management and managed care contracting joint venture").
23. Id.; An HMO is "a health care system that assumes or shares both the financial risks
and the delivery risks associated with providing comprehensive medical services to a voluntarily enrolled population in a particular geographic area, usually in return for a fixed, prepaid
fee."
Frequently Asked Questions, BLUECROss
BLUESHIELD
Ass'N,
http://www.bcbs.com/about/faq/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). For a discussion of fee-forservice
plans,
see
Fee-for-Service
Health
Coverage,
KIPLINGER,
http://www.kiplinger.com/basics/archives/2003/11/fee.html (June 2010).
24. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 161, 163.
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score on annual performance report cards and use key information technology. 2 5 This organizational structure establishes the framework for success.
Without joint contracting, realizing true gains in quality enhancement and
cost containment would be difficult.
IV. IMPORTANCE OF JOINT CONTRACTING

Joint contracting by the independent physicians with payors is critical to
the success of APP for several reasons. First, since all APP physicians must
participate in every signed contract, it assures a consistent network of physicians. This facilitates APP programs that integrate services across physicians and assures predictability of providers for patients. Second, it allows
health insurance companies and APP, on behalf of its doctors, to agree to a
common set of measures to be used by all physicians to improve quality,
safety and cost-effectiveness. APP has successfully negotiated this same
set of measures in all of its clinically integrated contracts, which greatly
simplifies the reporting of outcomes by physicians and focuses the improvement effort by physicians and their staffs. Third, joint negotiations
have allowed for the establishment of an incentive fund used by APP to
overcome the limitations of fee-for-service reimbursement and reward practices that improve quality, safety, and cost-effectiveness. Fourth, joint negotiations have secured the support for the infrastructure used by APP to
improve physician performance, such as information systems, registries,
training programs, and academic pharmacy detailing. Finally, joint negotiations lead to a greater market recognition by the physicians than if each
group entered into talks alone with the insurance company.
This joint contracting by APP on behalf of the 2900 independent physicians along with the 850 employed physicians is permitted under antitrust
laws because APP is structured to deliver improvement in quality, patient
o lo
attutlwde
26
Generally, antitrust law does not allow
safety, and cost-effectiveness.
competitors to jointly negotiate unless there is either financial integration or
clinical integration.27 Under these laws, agreements among competitors affecting the prices they charge for their services are per se unlawful pursuant
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act.28 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
historically permitted joint contracting between physician organizations if
they were financially integrated, but not until 1996 did it allow clinical integration to render the same treatment. The FTC established guidelines that
subject clinically integrated organizations to "rule of reason" treatment as

25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 162.

27.

Id. at 164.

28.

15 U.S.C. § 1(2010).
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opposed to "per se" analysis.29 Perse analysis is a presumption that certain
agreements are conclusively presumed to be an unreasonable restraint on
trade and thus, illegal.30 This analysis is extremely difficult to rebut. By
contrast, rule of reason analysis is a more in depth weighing of whether the
agreement unreasonably restricts competition, and is easier to defend.
Clinically and financially integrated programs, like APP, that sufficiently
demonstrate an ability to create efficiencies will receive rule of reason
treatment. First, HMO risk contracts demonstrate financial integrationand
APP has negotiated those types of contracts for the last fifteen years on behalf of the independent physicians. 3 2 Since 2004, however, APP has negotiated fee-for-service contracts (preferred provider contracts) on behalf of
the independent and employed physicians using the model of clinical integration of its programs as the basis of negotiations.33 Subsequently, APP
received approval from the FTC to proceed with these types of programs
and negotiations. APP used prior FTC decisions to guide its strategy and
organizational structure.34
V. BENEFITS OF THE MODEL
In addition to overcoming the four challenges to integrate physicians,
APP has demonstrated the ability to deliver progressively improved quality
outcomes. It has done this by using a variety of strategies, which include
incentive payments, formal collaborative educational programs for physicians and their staff using industry standard techniques, specific chronic
disease clinics that support the practicing physician, online education for
physicians and their staff, and electronic tools such as disease registries that
help physicians track outcomes and recall patients needing key services. 5
Furthermore, APP has demonstrated the ability to progressively increase
the use of health information technology across its physician network. This
began in 2004 with the requirement that all physician offices have high
High speed internet allowed physicians to have rapid
speed internet.

29. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE

& DEP'T

OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST

(Aug. 1996), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,153, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENTS].
30. United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 229 n.59 (1940).
31. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
32. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 162.
33. Id. at 165.
34. Id. at 164.
35. Id. at 163.
36. ADVOCATE PHYSICIAN PARTNERS, THE 2010 VALUE REPORT 29 (2010), availa
ble at http://www.advocatehealth.com/documents/app/final 1640_Value%20
Report%2020 10.pdf [hereinafter VALUE REPORT].
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access to results for diagnostic studies, laboratory tests, and hospital discharge information. APP's use of technology progressed to include webbased disease registries, which allow tracking of patients with chronic conditions in a physician's practice and recalling of these patients when appropriate.37 APP also utilizes web-based learning programs for both physicians
and staff which are designed to accelerate the quality and safety outcomes
of the program. Additional tools allow physicians to access all of their
filled prescriptions with prompts and reminders to identify opportunities for
generic substitution.
Quarterly report cards on physician performance are also available electronically. APP facilitated electronic prescribing by providing links to physician billing systems and training physicians and staff on the tool and office reengineering to most effectively use it.39 It accelerated the use of
electronic tools in the hospital by educating its physicians and providing incentives for use. 4 0 These tools included computerized physician order entry
and use of the electronic intensive care unit.41 Finally, the use of electronic
data interchange (EDI) for the submission of bills to managed care organizations was accelerated through education and incentives.42 This rate of
adoption, which is higher than the general market, led to significant savings
for managed care organizations.43
Although APP is now deploying a fully integrated electronic health
record, it is worth noting that APP's initiatives began without a widespread
implementation of electronic health records. APP piloted a full electronic
health record in 2009 and began a rollout of an integrated health record in
the summer of 2010." It is expected that the system will have 1000 independent physicians in this integrated system by mid-2012. The 850 employed physicians had initial access to an integrated electronic health
record, which has been progressively rolled out across this group since
2006. By the end of 2010, 650 of the 850 physicians had a fully deployed
electronic health record.45
37. Id. at 11, 14.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id.; Shields et al., supra note 4, at 166.
40. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 14.
41. Id. at 14-15.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 168.
44. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 15.
45. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS OVERVIEW 1 (2006) ("The
Electronic Health Record (EHR) is a longitudinal electronic record of patient health information generated by one or more encounters in any care delivery setting. Included in this information are patient demographics, progress notes, problems, medications, vital signs, past
medical history, immunizations, laboratory data and radiology reports. The HER automates
and streamlines the clinician's workflow. The EHR has the ability to generate a complete
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Of all the electronic tools deployed by APP, the disease registries have
been deemed to be the most powerful tool during the first seven years of
APP. These registries will be fully integrated with the electronic health
record so that data can be transmitted directly from the record to the registry.46 Many prompts and reminders have been built into the electronic
health record during its installation to assist physicians and their staff in
achieving the goals of APP's program.
VI. SELECTING PRIORITIES FOR A PROGRAM OF CLINICAL INTEGRATION

Improving the cost-effectiveness of services has been a focus of APP
since the beginning. For the purposes of the program, value can be thought
of as quality plus service divided by cost. 4 7 APP evaluates initiatives before
selection to ensure that they increase this value equation. Particular attention is paid to initiatives that help reduce indirect medical costs as well as
direct medical costs. Key indirect medical costs are absenteeism and presenteeism since they have a major impact on productivity for an employer.48
Absenteeism is the rate of lost days at work for an employee. 4 9 Presenteeism is the rate of reduced productivity that occurs when an employee is
present at work but is not fully productive.o An example of an initiative in
the APP program that reduces both absenteeism and presenteeism is the
screening and treatment for depression.5 1 Another APP high impact initiative that reduces direct medical costs and improves value has been the increase of generic pharmaceuticals when clinically appropriate. APP has
had a prescription rate of generic pharmaceuticals that is four to six percent
higher than the general market. This translates into over $20 million per

record of a clinical patient encounter, as well as supporting other care-related activities directly or indirectly via interface-including evidence-based decision support, quality management and outcomes reporting").
46.
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, REGISTRIES FOR EVALUATING
PATIENT OUTCOMES: A USER'S GUIDE No. 07-EHC0O1-1, at I (R.E. Gliklich & N.A. Dreyer,

eds. 2007) ("[A] patient registry is an organized system that uses observation study methods
to collect uniform data (clinical and other) to evaluate specified outcomes for a population
defined by a particular disease, condition or exposure. . to describe the natural history of a
disease, to determine the clinical effectiveness or cost effectiveness or health care products
and services, to measure or monitor safety and harm and/or to measure the quality of care").
47. PETER DUCHESSI, CRAFTING CUSTOMER VALUE: THE ART AND SCIENCE 85 (2002).
48. Paul Hemp, Presenteeism:At Work-But Out oflt, HARVARD Bus. REV. AT LARGE 1
(Oct. 2004), available at http://www.ihpm.org/pdf/HBR%20Presenteeism.pdf (Presenteeism
is defined as expenses, estimates based on employees' salaries, are the dollars lost to illnessrelated reductions in productivity).
49. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, Q. REP., CHAPTER 13: ABSENTEEISM (2006). (The BNA
quarterly report defined absenteeism as those absences that are unplanned and cause disruption in workflow or productivity).
50. Hemp, supra note 48, at 1.
51. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36.
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year in savings for employers, managed care organizations, and patients.52
Although these examples are representative of APP's successful outcomes,
utilization of transparency with identification of benefits to stakeholders are
critical factors for clinical integration to obtain market acceptance.
A. TransparencyofResults
The results of the APP program have been described each year in a
summary entitled the Value Report, which is distributed to employers, insurance companies, and other key constituencies and is available online to
the public. 5 3 This transparency is a critical part of the program for two reasons. First, physicians and hospitals are aware of this public reporting,
which helps accelerate performance.54 Furthermore, it allows APP to tell its
story directly to employers and the general public without having that performance translated by insurance companies.
B. Benefitsfor Stake Holders
The APP clinical integration program, which began in 2004, needed to
provide benefits to key participants in the health care market in order to be
successful. 56 APP had to offer benefits to hospitals, physicians, insurance
companies, employers, and patients. There are several benefits from the
clinical integration program for hospitals, including a business relationship
The joint outcomes include
with physicians to achieve joint outcomes.
improved cost-effectiveness for hospitals and improved patient safety. In
addition, the program can enhance physician loyalty to the institution.
Likewise, there are several benefits of the program for physicians. These
include: better alignment with hospitals, marketplace recognition, incentive
payments for services not covered by fee-for-service compensation, rewards
for clinical excellence, and an interface with multiple insurance compa-

52. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 168.
53. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 9, tbl. 1.
54. See, e.g., ANN LENNARSON GREER, EMBRACING ACCOUNTABILITY: PHYSICIAN
LEADERSHIP, PUBLIC REPORTING, AND TEAMWORK IN THE WISCONSIN COLLABORATIVE ON
QUALITY 14 (Commonwealth Fund 2008).
55. Merrill Goozner, Quality, Economy, Transparency:A New Healthcare Code, FISCAL
TIMES, May 10, 20 10, availableat http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/
Columns/2010/05/1 0/How-A-Wisconsin-Program-Can-Save-Americas-Health-CareSystem.aspx.
56. Health Care System "In Pursuit of Excellence" Case Example (Oct. 2008), AM.
Hosp. ASS'N, http://www.aha.org/aha/member-center/constituency-sections/
Health-Care-Systems/advocatecase.html.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 165.
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nies. 0
Finally, there are multiple advantages to the marketplace, which comprises patients, insurance companies, and employers. These advantages include: providers focusing on outcomes and enhanced value, demonstration
of efficiencies of care delivery, a stable and cohesive network of providers
that is focused on improved outcomes, transparency of results, and leadership by physicians of a reengineered health system.
C. CriticalSuccess Factorsfor ClinicalIntegration
There are a number of factors that have been critical to the success of the
clinical integration program. First, physician leadership has been essential.
Although APP is a joint venture between hospitals and physicians, physi62
cians have spearheaded the program design and implementation. Again,
negotiations with insurance companies have insisted on a common set of
metrics and thresholds for success. 6 3 This has allowed APP and the physicians to focus on a single set of metrics with a single reporting system,
which has helped drive results. Although physicians acknowledge that efforts such as care management and patient follow-up are important, they are
64
not reimbursed for these services by the fee-for-service system.
Thus,
payment to physicians for improving clinical performance and for services
not compensated by fee-for-service payments has countered this traditional
disincentive and led to improved outcomes.6 5 Additionally, infrastructure
support has been critical for the success of the program. This infrastructure
has included tools such as web-based disease registries, formal educational
programs for physicians and staff, coaching physicians on the use of health
care information technology, and outreach efforts to patients to increase adherence to key processes. 6 6 At the same time, much effort is needed to optimize the expenditures for infrastructure since these funds take away from
potential incentive payments to physician practices. Finally, the alignment
between hospitals and physicians has helped accelerate change both for inpatient care as well as outpatient care.67 Hospitals bring considerable information technology, management expertise and capital that otherwise
would not be available to physician groups and the program helps to better
68
engage physicians.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 164-65, 169.
Id. at 162, 164.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
See Shields et al., supra note 4, at 163-64.
Id. at 164, 166, 169.
Id. at 166, 169.
Id. at 162, 164, 169.
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VII. TRANSITION FROM CLINICAL INTEGRATION PROGRAM TO
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATION

The APP clinical integration program has laid the groundwork for further
innovations that are available to both the commercial market and government programs. These innovations include bundled payments, prevention
of readmissions, and accountable care organizations. 69 In fact, APP has entered into a contract effective January 1, 2011 with Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Illinois, the largest carrier in the state, that is a shared savings contract
structured similar to what is expected to emerge from the federal government for ACOs.7 0
A. Shared Savings Contract
As stated above, APP's contract with Blue Cross Blue Shield is a shared
savings contract.7 As a result of this arrangement, APP will share in savings generated by a rate of increase in health care costs that is slower than
the rate of increase across the comparable market in Illinois, when both are
calculated on a risk-adjusted basis.7 2 All costs in the provision of care are
included in the contract including those associated with inpatient, outpatient, diagnostic testing, skilled nursing facility, home care, and pharmaceutical costs.
B. ContractDurationIncreased To Enable Reengineering of Care
The typical two-year contract that has been used between Blue Cross and
APP in the past has been extended to a three-year contract in recognition of
the significant infrastructure and time that will be required to reengineer the
way care is provided in order achieve the desired savings. 73 The types of
necessary changes which will occur include training of providers, develop69. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3023, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.) (describing the national pilot program on payment bundling).
70. See id. § 3025 (explaining the provisions of the hospital readmissions reduction program).
71. Shields et al., supra note 4, at 169 (describing APP's contract with Blue Cross Blue
Shield); see also id at 164 (describing shared savings from ACOs).
72. Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 1 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf; Slowing the rate of increase in health
care costs is a priority for many providers because of the dramatic increase in these costs in
recent years. Spending on health care in the United States increased from 7.2% of the gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1970 to 17.6% of the GDP in 2009, and is expected to continue
to nse.
73. Advocate Health Care, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois Sign Agreement Focusing on Improving Quality Bending the Health Care Cost Curve, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD
OF ILLINOIS (Oct. 6, 2010), availableat http://www.bcbsil.com/companyinfo
/newsroom/news/advocate announcement.html.
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ment of new internal APP incentives, new information technology tools,
dedicated case management staff, and reengineering of inpatient care. 4 For
example, Advocate will employ over 70 full-time nurses dedicated to primary physician practices to perform care management on the high risk patients in the program. They will be supported with computerized care management software that monitors patient progress according to guidelines and
is available to all providers across the continuum of care. In addition, ten
practice coaches will be deployed across the physician network to help physicians interpret performance data in order to improve their practice patterns
and the patterns of the consultants they use.
C. Attributed Patients
The calculation of savings and the measurement of quality and safety
outcomes will be performed on attributed patients - patients receiving care
within the APP network two or more times over a two year period. 7 5 The
attribution technique is essential for the success of this type of program
since it is built on the standard preferred provider contract which allows patients to change providers at any time. This is prospective, allowing APP
to identify patients in the program and to reach out to the patients on behalf
of the treating physicians to encourage participation in programs that enhance patient outcomes. These include services for chronic disease, as well
as prevention services.
D. Regular PerformanceMeasurement andIncentives
It is anticipated that there will be at least quarterly measurements of cost
performance with interim payments made to APP for any shared savings
earned. 77 There will be an annual reconciliation of the quarterly payments.78 In addition, regular measurement of quality and safety outcomes
will be performed, and penalties will be imposed for any deterioration in
performance.79
E. Key Elements of Success for Shared Savings Contract
For a shared savings contract to be successful, there will have to be reengineering of the full care continuum. Preventive services will need to be
enhanced. Outpatient care for chronic diseases and access to primary care
will need to be re-tooled to avoid emergency room use and avoidable hospital admissions. Hospital care must be revamped to optimize length of
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Shields et al., supra note 4, at 162.
BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS,
VALUE REPORT, supra note

supra note 73.

36, at 6.

Id.
Id.
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stay and improve safety. And, transitions from the hospital to home or
nursing home or home nursing will need to be redesigned to avoid needless
readmissions to the hospital. APP, while working in all of these areas,
however, will focus on the key elements of success for the early years of
this shared savings program.
These key elements include: (1) a reduction in unnecessary hospital use,
(2) increased access to primary care, and (3) the use of backfill tactics.o
Since such a large portion of the health care dollar is spent on hospital care
and significant opportunities have been identified both nationally and locally to optimize use of the hospital, the reduction of unnecessary hospital use
is a key initial focus of this shared savings program. Providers can minimize unnecessary utilization through avoidance of readmissions, utilization of
optimal outpatient care and reduction in length of stay as compared to national benchmarks. Additionally, an increase in access to primary care is
viewed as a key strategy to reduce emergency room use, to optimize the
management of chronic disease, and to provide appropriate diagnostic evaluations. The appropriate use of pharmaceuticals is another cornerstone tactic." The use of appropriate generic prescriptions as well as the evidencebased use of expensive biologic formulations will be implemented as part of
this program. 82 Also, APP will need to continue to enhance prior programs
to improve quality, patient safety and patient experience in order to document the value of the clinical integration program. Finally, "backfill" of
hospital beds is needed to maintain hospital viability. Since fewer hospital
bed days will be needed per 1000 patients if the program is successful,
APP, with its hospital partners, will encourage physicians to use Advocate
hospitals for a larger portion of their practice and to encourage more physicians to join APP.
F. Mechanisms to PursueElements for Success
Additional tactics in the initial phase of this shared savings program have
been selected to achieve the key elements of success. Models from patient
centered medical home literature have been evaluated to select those strategies that have the greatest return on investment. Mechanisms to improve
primary care access include electronic visits, group visits, open access techniques, and use of advanced practice nurses.83 Patient communication and
80. Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between HealthPlans andProviders,30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 38 (2011).
81. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 33 (discussing computerized physician order entry
systems).
82. Id. at 18.
83. An E-Visit Primer, AM. MED. Ass'N (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2006/11/13/ edsal 113.htm; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH &
QUALITY, Group Primary Care Visits Improve Outcomes for Patients with Chronic Condi-
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outreach will be essential to increase the selection of APP providers by patients. Tactics to improve ambulatory care outcomes, such as the use of
dedicated care managers, chronic disease clinics, and clinical protocols will
be expanded. 84 Improvement of inpatient care through greater use of hospitalists and physician centric case managers will be utilized.8' Additionally,
transition care managers, medication reconciliation, and prompt office visits
after discharge which have successfully reduced readmission rates in many
cases will be used more extensively .
Protocols, implemented with the assistance of care managers in emergency rooms, could help deflect hospital admissions to more appropriate
settings, such as home care or skilled nursing facilities. This could optimFurthermore, programs that use
ize the use of such post-acute settings.
advanced practice nurses and dedicated physicians to perform rounds at
skilled nursing facilities will be developed. Since all of the cost calculations are risk adjusted for the shared savings contract, emphasis will be
placed on instructing providers to record appropriate diagnostic codes. 88
Lastly, analytic tools that provide rapid feedback to providers will be added
to the traditional clinical integration reporting tools used by APP.
Tactics to expand market share for Advocate hospitals are needed since
success of other improvement mechanisms will actually lead to reduction of
hospital use, and thus reimbursement, for a given population. 8 9 These include better communication with patients and physicians, as well as development of performance incentives for physicians. As such, promotion to
tions, http://www.innovations.ahrq.gov/content.aspx?id=1890#
(last updated Dec. 22,
2010); AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, Open Access Scheduling for Routine and UrgentAppointments, http://www.cahps.ahrq.gov/qiguide/content/interventions/
OpenAccessScheduling.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2011); Thomas Bodenheimer & Rachel
Berry-Millett, Follow the Money-ControllingExpenditures by Improving Carefor Patients
Needing Costly Services, 361 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1521, 1521 (2009).
84. H. Carl Palmer et al., The Effect of a HospitalistService with Nurse DischargePlanner on Patient Care in an Academic Teaching Hospital, 111 AM. J. MED. 627, 631 (2001);
Susan Jaques, Using A Physician-alignedCase Management Model to Influence Hospital
Length ofStay and PayerDenials. 7 LIPPINCOTT'S CASE MGMT. 113, 119 (2002).
85. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 18; see also Maria T. Currier & Morris H. Miller,
Medicare Payment Reform: Accelerating the Transformation of the U.S. Healthcare Delivery System andNeed for New Strategic ProviderAlliances, 22 HEALTH LAWYER 30, 33, 35
(2010).
86. VALUE REPORT, supra note 36, at 3 (letter from APP President, Lee Sacks, M.D.).
87. Allan H. Goroll, MD, et al., Fundamental Reform of Payment for Adult Primary
Care: Comprehensive Payment for Comprehensive Care, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 410,
410 (2007), available at http://www.springerlink.com /content/x864841076775u6p/.
88. Karen Davis, PhD, et al., A 2020 Vision of Patient-CenteredPrimary Care, 20 J.
at
available
(2005),
954
953,
MED.
INTERNAL
GEN.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ 10.111 1/j. 1525-1497.2005.0178.x/pdf.
89. See, e.g., ARTEMIS MARCH, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR CLINICAL PATHWAYS AND
OUTCOMES MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER OF
SAN DIEGO 30 (Commonwealth Fund 2003).
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patients that highlight the advantages to them of the coordination among
care managers in the inpatient, outpatient, home care settings, and with the
primary care settings will be implemented.9 0 Physicians will be educated
on the opportunities in a shared savings program to be rewarded for delivering value to patients instead of the traditional rewards for volume only. If
APP can be first to market with a shared savings program, physicians will
realize these benefits can be derived at Advocate and will move more of
their practice to Advocate. In this new structure, value for patients- better
quality, safety and cost-effectiveness will be the key determinant of financial and programmatic success. APP's clinical integration program has established credibility with physicians and the market and the additional tools
described will make an ACO program even more attractive to physicians,
patients, employers, and insurance companies.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Advocate and APP are well positioned to take on the commercial and
governmental contracts represented by an ACO. Past experience in a clinical integration program provides a foundation for teamwork between physicians from multiple specialties and a hospital working to improve quality,
patient safety, and cost-effectiveness. The Advocate and Blue Cross Blue
Shield contract serves as a prototype of a commercial ACO. Furthermore,
it fits with Advocate's long-term strategy to provide lifelong relationships
with patients to meet their health care needs, regardless of setting. To succeed, Advocate and APP must outperform the market competition. The
program must perform better by reducing readmissions, avoiding unnecessary admissions and emergency room visits, expanding primary care access,
and enhancing quality and patient safety. We believe that the mechanisms
described above will enable attainment of these elements of success.
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